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Hard-core Tantric practice is disgusting, a point several scholars make. 
Scholarly interpretations of Tantric disgustingness, however, tend to 
follow the lead of Mary Douglas in suggesting that what disgusts is 
ultimately a reflection of social–historical concerns with borders and 
boundaries. Such interpretations fail to take seriously the Tantric con- 
sumption of feces, menstrual blood, urine, semen, and phlegm. 
Likewise, they fail to take seriously the particular sexual act involved, 
that is, intercourse with a menstruating, riding-astride, out-of-caste, 
mother-substitute. Consulting contemporary disgust research, I suggest 
that hard-core Tantra is literally disgusting because it is literally malad- 
aptive. Disgust was naturally selected to deter the ingestion of bio-toxic 
pathogens as well as the practice of suboptimal sexual intercourse. 
Disgust maintains the species’ viability. Tantra confounds disgust and 
thus disgusts. Tantra engages antibiological behaviors in its characteris- 
tically religious war against the body. As a disgusting religion, Tantra 




IT IS THE ELEPHANT in the room of Tantric studies (Wedemeyer 
2007). Scandalously substituting tongues for hands, the proverbially 
blindfolded men in this particular room prefer to lick, eat, and occa- 
sionally fornicate their way to nondual gnosis. While their Advaita 






contours of which represent some version of South Asian idealism, 
these blindfolded men pursue “a materialized notion of non- 
dualism”(Openshaw 2002: 249). Tantra is “practical Advaita Vedānta” 
(Kinsley 1997: 90). 
It is, of course, Tantra’s materiality, its practicality that most often 
fascinates (see also Heath et al. 2001; Urban 2003). Generally perceived, 
Tantra stands opposed to—or in high tension with—what most con- 
sider the norms and etiquettes of “mainline” religion not only on the 
South Asian subcontinent but around the world as  well (Stark  and 
Finke 2000; Curtis 2007). Perhaps there is something liberating about 
such social antimodels (Kinsley 1997: 251). Significantly, though, where 
the social–historical routinely locates opposition and thus subversive 
religio-politics, the biological locates continuity. “Hard core” Tantra 
(White 2003: 13) is and is not in opposition to “mainline” South Asian 
religions.1 True, hard-core Tantra brazenly engages what South Asian 
culture generally proscribes. However, as the logical conclusion of a 
certain universal religious impulse, an impulse the explanation of which 
recommends biological considerations (Burkert 1996), hard-core Tantra 
completes heroically what mainline South Asian religions begin only 
timidly (Kakar 1989: 122). Proposing that the study of Tantra to date 
has been primarily descriptive and social–historical in nature, I believe 
we have yet to explain satisfactorily this heroic completion, that is, this 
“spiritually pragmatic” path (Kinsley 1997: 86). For this, I propose we 
turn to biology. 
Risking the evocation of a certain “politically correct” ire, I claim 
that hard-core Tantra is disgusting, and this universally so. Universally 
disgusting substances and behaviors reflect a universally shared biology 
(Curtis and Biran 2001; Curtis 2007; Rozin et al. 2009). Fashionable— 
though hopefully waning—disdain for human universals notwithstand- 
ing, they exist (Brown 1991). What is more, these biological and 
ultimately ethological universals affect significantly the construction and 
execution of certain cultural practices, a phenomenon some refer to as 
“evoked culture” (see also Waller et al. 1990; Barkow et al. 1992; Buss 
2001: 974; Fessler and Navarette 2003b). Many, of course, disagree. 
According to Tooby and Cosmides (1992), many in the human sciences 




1It should be noted that the qualifying coefficient “hard core” has not been universally adopted 
by those working on Tantra. The phrase seems to have a certain pornographic ring in Western 
cultures. The extent to which D. G. White wishes to incorporate such allusions is both unclear and 
ultimately unimportant. For the present discussion, I will employ White’s usage of “hard core 
Tantra” when designating the particular style of practice I wish to explain. 
 
to which David Buss rightly attributes “the myth of culture as a causal 
explanation” (2001: 968). Including in its intellectual pedigree influen- 
tial authors such as Emile Durkheim, Mary Douglas, and Clifford 
Geertz, the SSSM suggests that biology merely provides a “blank slate” 
upon which culture inscribes its biologically independent system of 
arbitrary symbols and meanings, apparently never  pausing  to  consider 
what enables the acquisition of culture in the first place (Barkow et al. 
1992; Pinker 2002). For the SSSM, cultural symbols and meanings are 
in effect irreducible or, and what amounts to the same, sui generis (Rue 
2005: 5). Despite the  rather  widespread  appeal  of  this  approach,  it  is 
not mine. I am interested here in the significant though heretofore 
unrecognized role that biology plays  in the construction and execution 
of hard-core Tantric sādhana, or practice. Tantra’s counsel concerning 
the ingestion of pathogenic substances coupled with the practice of 
maximally suboptimal sexual intercourse with an out-of-caste partner is 
best explained, I argue, by considering the “evolutionary  arms  race” 
(Mayr 2001: 210) between humans and their  parasites  and  pathogens 
(May and Anderson 1979; Hart 1990; Ridley 1993; van Blerkom 2003; 
Schaller 2006; Schaller and Duncan 2007; Schaller and Murray 2008). 
My approach resonates with, while simultaneously departing from, 
the growing interest in biological studies of religion at large (Persinger 
1987; Burkert 1996; Hinde 1999; Boyer 2001; Newberg et al. 2001; 
Atran 2002; Sweek 2002; Hamer 2004; Kirkpatrick 2005; Rue 2005; 
Dennett 2006; King 2007; Bulbulia et al. 2008; Ellis 2008a, 2009b; 
Slingerland 2008; Feierman 2009; Shermer 2011; Wilson  1998). 
Generally eschewing  the  empirically  unfounded,  a  priori  commitments 
of the SSSM, biology of religion often explains contemporary religious 
behaviors and beliefs by appealing to behaviors and beliefs originally 
selected for alternative ends. Few in the biology of religion view reli- 
gious phenomena as sui generis (Taves 2008, 2009; Ellis 2008b). 
Accordingly, religious behaviors are often thought to be by-products of 
naturally selected behaviors, that is, behaviors originally selected  for their 
reproductive advantages in the “pre-religious” Pleistocene (c. 2.5 million 
years ago to twelve thousand years ago). For instance, an attach- ment 
system naturally selected for the survival of vulnerable progeny eventually 
gives rise to religious beliefs and behaviors regarding divine attachment 
figures (Kirkpatrick 2005; Ellis 2009a). Similarly, the desire to group 
and by extension identify members of the out-group—a coali- tional 
psychological adaptation ostensibly in the service of intergroup warfare 
and pillaging—clearly influences a certain religious impulse (Irons 
2008). Routinely, such attachment and grouping  behaviors  not only   find   
support   in   but   are   positively   sanctioned   by   religious 
  
  
injunctions and codes, potentially facilitating thereby a multilevel selec- 
tion phenomenon (Wilson 2002). Regardless of the details specific to 
any one study, most working in the biology of religion generally under- 
stand religion to be an evolutionary by-product that occasionally 
accomplishes either or both of the following: (i) mitigation of existential 
anxieties through socioeconomic exchange with and occasional manipu- 
lation of nonnatural agents and (ii) a prosocial code enhancing the sur- 
vival and reproductive success of the group’s members by controlling 
antisocial tendencies within—for example, deception—while simultane- 
ously lending competitive edge in a resource struggle against those 
without (Stark and Finke 2000; Atran 2002). 
It is not my concern here to assess the validity of such studies. 
I admit that I find them intriguing and often compelling, all the while 
realizing that for some authors of these studies  amount  to  nothing 
more than “idle Darwinizing” (Richardson 2007: 183; see also Stark 
2007: 43). The debates and controversies concerning the role that bio- 
logical methods and theories play in the study of human behavior and 
culture will, undoubtedly, continue for quite some time. In the mean- 
time, these philosophical concerns ought not to forestall further 
inquiry. They certainly do not forestall the present inquiry. 
Though sharing an interest in the biology of religion, I depart—for 
this particular project—from the perspectives just considered. Where 
many see if not an amicable relationship then at least a continuous one 
between a biological past and a religious present, so to speak, I am 
interested in identifying and then explaining those moments when reli- 
gions become positively maladaptive: that is, when religions promote 
beliefs and behaviors biologically offensive to the naturally selected 
human body. To offend the naturally selected human body is to depress 
its chances of (i) survival to reproductive maturity and then (ii) success- 
ful reproduction (the basic goals of any sexually reproducing species). 
Maladaptive religions threaten these goals. Tantra threatens these goals. 
Recognizing the incendiary potential of the argument that follows, 
I want to be absolutely clear on one most important point. 
Characterizing a religious tradition as biologically maladaptive does not 
entail uncritical condemnation. The naturalistic fallacy cuts both ways. 
Inasmuch as a natural origin of a behavior or belief need not compel 
continued endorsement, so too an “unnatural” origin need not compel 
dismissal. Avoiding for the present normative evaluations of any stripe, 
I am simply interested in identifying and then explaining those 
moments when Tantric practice offends the biologically normative 
interests of the human body. If such practice does indeed offend the 
 
body—and  this  is  precisely  what  I  claim—then  Tantra  is  truly 
disgusting. 
The present discussion unfolds over three sections. I first describe 
what I take to be the two constitutive practices of hard-core Tantra. 
Because there are many excellent historical, descriptive studies of such 
practices already in print, I will be brief in my own description.2 What 
is more, my description will keep to the actual substances consumed 
and sexual activities engaged. I do not intend to examine the rather 
baroque theologies often attending Tantric practices. Like the historical, 
descriptive literature, these theologies have been the focus of sustained 
scholarly attention for quite some time. As such, I will reference 
Tantric theologies only to indicate how the actual practices may seem- 
ingly accomplish the theological intentions. Although uninterested in 
the minutiae of Tantric theologies, I am, to be sure, interested in not 
only the historical descriptions of the practices but also the rather 
typical scholarly interpretation, a few illustrative cases of which I also 
briefly examine. I do this not simply for the sake of a literature review, 
but rather to identify what I believe to be a discrepancy between the 
actual Tantric practices and these scholarly interpretations, an identifi- 
cation that sets the context for the present discussion’s contribution. 
The critical study of Tantra suffers a rather significant explanatory 
lacuna. 
The second section of the article examines contemporary biological 
and social–psychological research on disgust. To date, no studies of 
Tantra have consulted this research. This is truly curious once  we 
realize that claiming that Tantra is disgusting is not so terribly contro- 
versial after all. Indeed, several authors clearly recognize “typical 
Tantric disgustingness” (Wedemeyer 2007: 391). The issue I wish to 
raise here concerns the very meaning of disgust and the disgusting. In 
the absence of any explicit consideration of this issue, the descriptive 
and social–historical approaches to Tantric disgustingness fail to 
explain the practice. This is the case because the descriptivists and 
 
 
2I recognize that Nemec (2009) has recently appealed to scholars of South Asian religions to 
engage in more translation projects, believing that more translations will lead to greater nuance in 
our understanding of said traditions. Clearly, this is the case. As Proudfoot (1985) noted, we 
cannot engage in descriptive reductions. However, I believe Nemec’s position runs the risk of yet 
again substituting language studies and translations for the larger work of the field, which is clearly 
redescriptive in orientation (Smith 2004: 368). I thus agree with Wilson: “Certainly we do not lack 
facts. . . . In addition to a sizeable social scientific literature on religion, there is a much larger 
body of traditional scholarship on religions around the world and throughout history. This 
information is descriptive. . . . What we lack is a comprehensive framework for organizing the facts 
about religion” (2008: 23). Perhaps we similarly lack a comprehensive framework for organizing 
the facts about Tantra. 
  
  
social historians generally remain content in following Douglas’ (1966) 
abstraction of dirt and disgust from considerations of hygiene and path- 
ogenicity. This is a mistake. Douglas’ position is not borne out by con- 
temporary disgust research. Accordingly, we must extend our 
“exegetical fussiness” (Tweed 2006: 30) with the category of “religion” 
to those descriptive terms that hold greater promise for explanatory 
contribution. When it comes to the critical study of Tantra, exegetical 
fussiness with respect to “disgust” is most warranted. 
The third and final section of the article applies the biological and 
social–psychological research on disgust, reviewed in the second section, 
to the Tantric practices and claims reviewed in the first. My argument 
is that the central practices of hard-core Tantric sādhana, that is, the 
consumption of pathogenic substances and the practice of maximally 
suboptimal sexual intercourse with an out-of-caste partner, are precisely 
the two behaviors most offensive to the naturally selected human body. 
Hard-core Tantra’s material nondualism is literally disgusting because it 
is positively maladaptive. 
 
TANTRIC SUBSTANCES AND SEXUALITY 
As it is with any religious tradition, “Tantra” is clearly overdeter- 
mined. There is no one Tantra. As such, I will not attempt to encom- 
pass in one general theory all Tantric practices. That would amount to 
hermeneutical naiveté, if not hubris; therefore, I delimit here the focus 
of my attention. The most important delimitation concerns what many 
recognize as the two Tantric paths, that is, the right-  and  the  left- 
handed paths (Kinsley 1997: 46). While the right-handed paths often 
engage in visualizations and meditations aimed at realizing some form 
of monistic idealism, the left notoriously utilize what have traditionally 
been called the pañcatattva, that is, meat, fish, wine, parched grain, and 
illicit sexual intercourse. The purposes for which these and other sub- 
stances and behaviors are employed will occupy our attention shortly. For 
now, I admit that my concerns are not with the right-handed path and 
all of its variants. The elephant in the room of Tantric s tudies clearly has 
nothing to do with South Asian idealisms; such idealisms abound in 
mainline South Asian history and scholarship.  Rather,  the focus here is 
on the material  dimensions  of  the  so-called  left-handed path, especially 
those forms of left-handed practice D. G. White gener- ally categorizes 
as “hard core.” 
At the heart, or better yet “gut,” of hard-core Tantric practice is 
the generation and consumption of “clan nectar” or kulāmrta (White 
2003: 76). The Tantric practitioner consumes, or occasionȧlly dons, a 
 
concoction of “jewels” (ratna) or “moons” (candra) more often than 
not identified as menstrual blood, semen, urine, feces, and phlegm 
(McDaniel 1989; Jha 1995; White 1996, 2003; Kinsley 1997; Openshaw 
2002).3 According to the ninth- to tenth-century Kaulajñānanirnaya, 
the   practitioner   is   enjoined   to   consume   “poison,   menstrual   ḃlood 
(dhārāmrtam), semen, blood, and marrow. . .  . One should practice the 
drinkinġ of [their] menstrual blood (dhārapāna). . . . One should con- 
stantly drink blood and semen” (quoted in White 2003: 76). Likewise, 
the Kaulāvalinirnaya, dating approximately to the sixteenth century, 
instructs  the  prȧctitioner  to  “worship  the  Goddess  with  the  nectar  of 
vulva and penis . . . by drinking of the virile fluid” (quoted in White 
2003: 74). The source of these moons or jewels varies.  Some practi- 
tioners employ the categories of ekak or yugal (Jha 1995: 69). Ekak 
(oneself/alone) moons are either one’s own or those of the guru and/or 
the guru’s wife. Yugal (other/with partner) moons are either svakīyā, 
that is, one’s spouse’s, or parakīyā, that is, moons of any indiscriminate- 
member-of-the-opposite-sex. Further qualifying these moons is the 
timing of consumption, that is, whether the moons should be consumed 
immediately upon issuance from the body or whether they should be 
exposed to heat. Finally, and quite possibly for the “faint-of-will,” the 
moons apparently may be consumed on their own or diluted with other 
substances so as to make them, tellingly I might add, “more palatable” 
(Openshaw 2002: 227). 
Though choosing the source of the moons appears to be  an  open issue, 
some of the more striking examples of Tantric practice clearly fall into 
the “yugal-parakīyā” class. For instance, the “hagiography” of the 
Tantric saint Ramakrishna relates how he went to  the  riverbank  and 
found a pile of human feces, to which he applied his tongue. The hagi- 
ographer Swami Nikhilananda notes, once again rather tellingly, that 
Ramakrishna “felt no disgust” (quoted in Kripal 1995: 270). In another 
rather striking example, Jha relates an instance when the Tantric practi- 
tioners not only sought  out  and  consumed  “random  moons,”  but 
actually bloody feces, that is, feces indicative of dysentery (1995: 91). 
Both instances clearly exemplify yugal-parakīyā sādhana with the added 




3For the sake of economy, I will from this point forward simply reference the “Tantric 
practitioner” or “Tantric practice,” understanding that the qualification between right-handed 
practitioners/practice and left-handed practitioners/practice has already been established and still 
applies. Also, while there may be different theological traditions associated with the left-handed 
practice, I am once again most interested in a biological explanation of the “hard core” practice 
itself, irrespective of the particular theological tradition. 
  
  
pathogen-rich excreta constitutes the first of the two limbs of hard-core 
Tantric sādhana. 
As with the generation and oral consumption of the moons, typical 
Tantric disgustingness equally applies to maithuna, or sexual inter- 
course, the second limb. Tantric sex typically involves a Tantric hero 
(vīra) and his mystical lover ( yoginī), a lover often understood to be not 
only a goddess but, and more importantly for us, a mother-substitute. 
Jeffrey J. Kripal suggests in this regard that Tantric sex is “a form of 
mystical incest” (1995: 90). Jeanne Openshaw similarly notes that barta- 
man panthis—for all intents and purposes here a type of hard-core 
Tantric practitioner—conflate the two roles, that is, the lover and the 
mother (2002: 178). What is more, the mother-substitute ought to be 
menstruating, and as clearly depicted in Tantric icons, this menstruat- 
ing mother-substitute ought to ride astride the male partner, assuming 
thereby the dominant position (Kinsley 1997: 7; Openshaw 2002: 199). 
Finally, the hero’s yoginī often issues from a lower caste, a qualification 
clearly confounding the incestuous intention. It is this admittedly over- 
determined combination of mystically incestuous intercourse with a 
menstruating, riding-astride, out-of-caste woman and the consumption 
of the attendant bodily fluids and other excreta that is the elephant in 
the room of Tantric studies. How indeed are we to explain such seem- 
ingly scandalous behaviors? 
Generally speaking, Tantric practitioners consciously engage these 
behaviors for one of two reasons. The first reason concerns power 
(Sanderson 1985). The practice was—and perhaps for some still is—an 
attempt at gaining what are in effect occult forms of power or siddhis 
(White 2009). These powers are either “magical” or “abstract” (White 
2003: 199). Among the abstract powers, we find capabilities such as 
“irresistible will,” “atomicity,” and “levity.” White significantly notes, 
however, that these abstract powers are later emendations to the histori- 
cal tradition. He proposes that the “magical” powers were the ones orig- 
inally sought out by, among others to be sure, the Hindu kings of 
medieval India. Some of the magical powers include “invisibility oint- 
ment,” “disappearance,”  “elixir of immortality,” and “telekinesis” (White 
2003: 199). In a passage of particular significance for our dis- 
cussion, White claims that there was one power that seemed to be most 
sought after: that of khecara, or flight (2003: 199–200). Admitting that 
my biological interests address more pointedly the practitioners’ second 
reason for undertaking Tantric sādhana, that is, liberation, I will offer 
here only a tentative explanation of the “power-bestowing” elements 
associated with the “first.” 
 
The first thing to note is that by consuming fecal matter, menstrual 
blood, and/or semen, one does not literally gain the power to become 
invisible or engage in telekinesis. These claims are fantastic and best left 
alone for the present discussion. That being said, we can nevertheless 
recognize that a different type of power may accrue to the person 
engaging these practices. Power attends status (Milner, Jr. 1994). 
Religious status is often purchased by means of charismatic or virtuosic 
displays. I suggest that one form of power resulting from Tantric prac- 
tice is charismatic in essence, and thus of a wholly psychological nature. 
To be sure, “religious elites”—including Tantric kings—often command 
the respect of others precisely through their explicit performance of 
what most people would only reluctantly do. That which most informs 
such reluctance may ultimately be biological in nature. In other words, 
those activities or behaviors conferring the most charisma and thus 
status may just be those activities least “pro-biological” in intention. For 
instance, many religious elites seem to enjoy their high status precisely 
to the extent that they are accomplished in the antibiological feat of 
celibacy, a topic to which we return toward the end of our discussion. 
For now, I will rest content with the hypothesis that the “power” gained 
through Tantric practice is charismatic in nature and thus is actually 
psychological before it is truly biological and/or physical.4 
The second reason for engaging hard-core Tantra, and the one for 
which I offer an explanation here, is the desire for liberation. According 
to Tantric literature and practitioners, liberation often involves achiev- 
ing a nondual awareness or existence, qualities often identified with the 
divine feminine and immortality (McDaniel 1989; Kinsley 1997; 
Openshaw 2002; White 2003). By becoming—sexually and gustatorily— 
one with the goddess, the practitioner is liberated from dualities and 
death. Although some authors wish to make a categorical distinction 
between these two emic reasons or goals, that is, between the search for 
power and the pursuit of liberation (Sanderson 1985; White 2009), there 
is actually a subtle equivalence. Clearly, the desire for liberation is 
grounded in existential concerns with the body and its impending 
demise (topics to which we return shortly). I believe a similar existential 
concern informs the Tantric interest in the predominant power of flight. 




4Anticipating the discussion that follows, I will admit that there is one possible explanation of 
Tantra’s power-bestowing capacity on a biological register. Though I do not believe this was the 
case, the argument may be made that by ingesting pathogen-rich substances, such as fecal matter, 
the consumer is in effect inoculating him/herself from further infection through exposure to low 
levels of pathogens. This position perhaps deserves further consideration. 
  
  
levitation fantasies, serve to mitigate death anxieties. The terror man- 
agement theorist Sheldon Solomon and his colleagues note, “flight fan- 
tasies are an archetypal example of humankind’s imaginative 
construction of supernatural conceptions of reality in response to the 
awareness of, and unwillingness to accept, death” (2010: 99; see also 
Cohen et al. 2011). That flight was the principle power sought—and 
this potentially as early as the Rg Veda (White 2003: 198)—sets the so- 
called psycho-historical stage fȯr the more explicit emphasis on libera- 
tion by means of nondual gnosis that we eventually find amid certain 
Tantric communities. 
Whether or not one actually transcends death by means of such 
practices, Openshaw is right to observe, “the four  moons practices, 
whether performed alone or with a partner, involve a shift or erasure of 
boundaries between self and not-self” (2002: 247). What has yet to be 
explained, however, is the significance of these practices, disgusting as 
they may be, for the achievement of that end. The correlation is no 
accident. I suggest that it is only by engaging the disgusting that one 
truly realizes nonduality. Here Tantric practice and Tantric theology 
coalesce. What is more, I argue that engaging the disgusting is the 
unrecognized-yet-logical conclusion of not only a general South Asian 
religious impulse, but a universal religious impulse as well. If this is in 
fact the case, then all religious paths quite possibly lead to Tantra. 
The anthropologist Jonathan Parry was not exaggerating when he 
suggested that “Hindu society is organized on a war footing against the 
body and its natural processes” (Parry 1989: 493). It is this war that 
potentially constitutes the religious impulse as such (Bloch 1992). 
Clearly, socio-religious status in South Asia is “constantly threatened by 
involvement with biological processes” (Parry 1989: 492; see also 
Milner, Jr. 1994; Fuller 2004). This threat is amply reflected in the 
widespread Hindu concerns with purity and impurity, concerns so 
significant that they, according to Patrick Olivelle, border  “on  scrupu- 
losity and anxiety—śaṅkā” (1998: 212).5 White similarly notes that 
Jayaratha—a commentator on the Kashmiri Tantric Abhinavagupta’s 
work—counts śarīraśaṅkā, or dread of the human body, as one 
concern that particularly exercises  the  attention  of  the  orthodox 
Brahmin (2003: 255). Jha adds, “The idealists and members  of  the 




5Though it exceeds the scope of the present discussion, we may note here that religious 
preoccupations with the body surely influence many of the religious traditions throughout the 
world. From St. Paul and St. Augustine to the Buddha and Ge Hong, the body is often a focus of 
(negative) religious attention. 
 
despicable” (1995:  101, emphasis  added). This generally perceived 
offense of the body is thoroughly borne out by the high Sanskritic liter- 
ary traditions, including the dharmasūtras and dharmaśāstras (Doniger 
and Smith 1991; Olivelle 1999), by historical and ethnographic studies 
(Mandelbaum 1970; Srinivas 1976; Bennett 1983; Fuller 2004; Seymour 
1999), and—perhaps most importantly—by empirical, social–psycho- 
logical research (Rozin et al. 1997; Haidt et al. 1997; Haidt and Keltner 
1999; Hejmadi et al. 2000; Curtis and Biran  2001;  Haidt  and  Algoe 
2004; Hejmadi et al. 2004; Elwood and Olatunji 2009).  Truly,  South 
Asians “then” and “now” find the substances  and  behaviors  of  hard- 
core  Tantra  disgusting  (Wedemeyer  2007).6 
Significantly for some, if not in fact many, bodily anxieties counsel 
the uptake of the religious life (Bloom 2004: 178). The psychoanalytic 
Indologist J. Moussaieff Masson in particular suggests that one of the 
resounding themes found in Indian philosophical and religious litera- 
ture concerns the disquietude of the embodied life: “Basic to all such 
Indian mystical texts, one can discern certain invariable themes . . . an 
awareness of transience; feelings of disgust with the world” (Masson 
1980: 51; see also White 2009: 22). Elsewhere he quotes a Hindu text 
on renouncing: “feeling that the body is not eternal, [he] felt disgust 
and left for the forest” (1976: 618; Finlay-Jones 1983; see also Power 
and Tarsia 2007). The first century Buddhist convert, Aśvaghosa, like- 
wise writes in his Buddhacarita: “I am a śramana, who in fear ̇of birth 
and death have left the home life for the sak̇e ȯf salvation” (quoted in 
White 2003: 198). Such world-weariness and disgust apparently moti- 
vated even suicidal behavior. The Mālinīvijayottara Tantra states “when 
[the yogi] considers all . . . experience to be repulsive, he relinquishes 
his own body and proceeds to the state of no return” (quoted in White 
2009: 116). If it is indeed the troubles with the material body that moti- 
vate the religious quest, then in much the same way as it is for psychia- 
try (Phillips et al. 1998), so too for religion, disgust is the forgotten 
emotion. It is the “forgotten” emotion to the extent that most religions 
explicitly celebrate qualities such as “quietness, devotion, beauty, purity, 
unity, atemporality, infinity, [and] noncorporeality” (Anttonen  1996: 
37). Such celebrations are in fact reactions to the disgusting realities of 
temporal, corporeal, and ultimately biological life. Cohen et al. note 




6It should be noted that the aesthetic traditions in  South  Asia  incorporated  the  category  of 
disgust (bībhatsa) as a primary rasa or emotion in the dramatic arts. Indeed, bībhatsa is listed in 
the famous Nātyaśāstra. While certainly interesting and worthy of attention, an examination of the 
aesthetic deplȯyment of disgust is beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
  
 
countless means, real and imagined, of reactively reasserting their sense 
of freedom from the body in the  face  of  death’s  ultimate  limitation. 
Such strategies for escaping a sense of creatureliness range from 
extreme asceticism to fantasies of eternal youth” (2011: 101). Certainly 
this is the impression we get from mainline South Asian culture. 
Curiously, while the scholarly community rightly recognizes in its 
descriptions Tantra’s disgustingness, scholarly interpretation seemingly 
fails to take this seriously. This is the case because many working in 
Tantric studies—not to mention the larger anthropology of purity and 
impurity in South Asia  and  beyond—continue  to  linger  in  Mary 
Douglas’ shadow. Douglas’ work is as influential as it is potentially 
misleading. 
Douglas (1966) (in)famously argued that what cultures find disgust- 
ing and dirty are simply tokens  of  a  much  deeper  social  concern. 
Dirt and disgust betray concerns with social borders and boundaries, 
categories and classifications. Dirt is matter out of place. Similarly, 
substances—and I would add behaviors—which appear incapable of 
strict classification, for instance viscous substances that are neither 
totally solid nor totally liquid, are generally found to be disgusting. For 
many social historians and cultural anthropologists, what disgusts is 
ultimately only what confounds a social system of order based on inju- 
dicious distributions of power and privilege (Milner, Jr. 1994). In this 
respect, social history routinely puts the social cart before the biological 
elephant: “Douglas has the local cosmology, or world order, coming 
first, with dirt as its product” (Curtis 2007: 663). Those who follow 
Douglas similarly, though equally mistakenly, put social realities ahead 
of biological ones. 
The late leading scholar of South Asian goddess traditions David 
Kinsley clearly follows Douglas. Describing Tantric sādhana, he writes, 
“In this way one overcomes the distinction (or duality) of clean and 
unclean, sacred and profane, and breaks one’s bondage to a world that 
is artificially fragmented” (1997: 78, emphasis added), continuing else- 
where, “What we experience as disgusting, polluted, forbidden, and 
gruesome is grounded in limited human (or cultural) consciousness, 
which has ordered, regimented, and divided reality  into categories that 
serve limited, ego-centered, selfish conceptions of how the world should 
be” (ibid.: 83). I agree and disagree with Kinsley. While I believe that 
we do order the world according to selfish conceptions, Kinsley is mis- 
taken in his subtle equation of the human with the cultural and the 
hygienic with the artificially fragmented. Kinsley apparently sees the self 
as a purely cultural construction. It is not. Divisions between the clean 
and the unclean, the pure  and  the impure,  and the  disgusting and  the 
 
nondisgusting may indeed be “selfish” but, and as I will show below, 
they are anything but cultural, if by that we imply arbitrary.7 
Much like Kinsley, Olivelle adopts Douglasian lines of reasoning. 
Explicitly agreeing with Douglas’ dismissal of attempts to connect 
impurity with hygiene, Olivelle affirms the rather arbitrary nature of the 
pure and the impure: “Concern for impurity translates into concern for 
maintaining the integrity of boundaries, both physical and classificatory, 
which in turn relates to the concern for maintaining social boundaries” 
(Olivelle 1998: 211). Once again, I agree and disagree. For Olivelle, 
impurity is merely a by-product of social–historical concerns and struc- 
tures. I disagree. I do agree, however, that the concern with impurity 
relates to a concern with the integrity of boundaries. Our disagreement 
rests on disparate understandings of the social. If the social generally 
addresses issues of self and other, or self and nonself, then we must 
countenance the possibility that there is a general division in the social. 
There are macro- and micro-social others (McNeill 1976). It is my con- 
tention that studies of Tantra to date have kept to the macro-social. The 
macro-social concerns self-other relations at the macroscopic level, that 
is, the level of human–human interaction. Such concerns rightly 
concern the social historian. I believe, however, that it is the micro- 
social concern that ultimately illuminates Tantra. Though we will 
engage in an extended discussion of the micro-social below, we may for 
the sake of clarity here characterize the micro-social other as the micro- 
scopic and ultimately parasitological other. Concerns regarding impur- 
ity may indeed translate into concerns for maintaining social 
boundaries, but not the arbitrary, macro-social boundaries to which 
Olivelle and others often allude. To be sure, Olivelle argues that the 
body is simply an accidental, after-the-fact medium for the inscription 
of biologically independent, macro-social concerns and regulations: 
“The human body becomes the locus for expressing all these concerns, 
especially the concern for maintaining purity” (1998: 21). Regardless of 
whether this is in fact the implication Olivelle wishes to impart, it is 





7I believe Kinsley similarly misinterprets a Tantric tale he recounts (1997: 28). Where Kinsley 
believes Śiva wishes to escape Pārvatī’s house, an allegorical reference to the body, in order “to 
indulge the senses willfully, to act without yogic discipline and control,” I believe we must see the 
exact opposite. As a mythological elaboration of the Sāṅhkyan purusa and prakrti metaphysic, the 
allegory alludes to Śiva’s desire to escape material embodiment˙in a moṁent of Himalayan 
meditation and idealism. The Tantric allegory suggests that consciousness is indeed trapped within 
the material body such that all attempts at transcendence must be attempted by way of and not in 
spite of the body. 
 
Although explicitly addressing Buddhist Tantra, many of 
Wedemeyer’s comments indirectly apply to Tantra as a whole; after all, 
he seems to implicate a history of Tantric studies in his discussion con- 
cerning the denotative and connotative semiotics of Tantric instruction 
and practice. In a most telling passage, Wedemeyer writes, 
 
the question of whether these words—cow meat,  dog  meat,  elephant 
meat, horse  meat,  human flesh and faeces, urine, blood, semen, 
marrow—signify real beef, urine, and so on, I would suggest, is close to 
irrelevant . . . what is important is their signifying  function,  their 
ability to instantiate ritual pollution as a lived fact. What is essential to 
the signification of the rite are the five  meats  and  five  ambrosias  as 
signs. . . . The actual signifier is, as de Saussure insists, arbitrary. (2007: 
407, emphases added) 
 
Saussurian semiology renders Tantric moons, like every other sign, 
arbitrary. Apparently, had the high Brahmanical tradition randomly 
chosen other objects as worthy of proscription, it would have been these 
and not feces and blood that would instantiate ritual impurity. Perhaps for 
this reason, Wedemeyer proposes that only a “naïve hermeneutic” insists 
on the literal, denotative meaning of the Tantric texts. While this may be 
the case, connotative semiotics all the same risks complicity with a Tantric 
ruse. Openshaw notes, “The allusive and complex rhetoric of a guru 
conversing with a group of initiates and non-initiates is in total contrast to 
the unambiguous and purely denotative language used in the 
private instruction of a disciple in esoteric practice” (2002: 116, 
emphasis added). Surely instructions are never as effective as they 
could be if they intentionally employ duplicitous language. Charges of 
hermeneutic naiveté notwithstanding, perhaps Tantric instructions are to be 
taken literally and ought to lead to the actual consumption of the moons. 
Wedemeyer eventually admits  as much: “Though I suspect that actual  
consumption was rare in practice by any but virtuosi—the possibility 
of such consumption must be avail- able . . . for the system of semiosis 
to work . . . that one could (and might) actually do it is important for 
the full impact of the semiosis of revulsion to occur” (2007: 408). The 
semiosis of revulsion only works because someone may have actually 
consumed human feces and blood, at which point I daresay that these 
substances are anything but arbitrary or irrelevant and are thus no 
longer amenable to high Saussurian analysis. It is precisely because 
these substances—not others—elicit “revulsion” upon actual 
consumption that they can even begin to be employed in semiotic play.  
I charge that social history in its many 
 
guises is simply incapable of explaining this revolting practice. For this, 
we must forego Mary Douglas’ counsel. We must reconnect dirt and 
disgust with hygiene and pathogenicity. Once we do this, we come to 
realize that everything about hard-core Tantric sādhana, down to the 
last fecal morsel, is both irrevocably relevant as well as irrevocably 
disgusting. 
 
DISGUST: ANIMAL NATURE AND CORE 
What is clear from the many descriptions of hard-core Tantra is that 
both insiders and outsiders find the practice disgusting. Some authors 
even recognize that it is precisely the evocation of the audience’s disgust 
that constitutes one of the motivations behind the practice (Kinsley 1997: 
83; Wedemeyer 2007: 401). Despite such concessions, most scholars 
explain Tantric practice as an attempt to subvert artificial divisions in 
reality in order to achieve some sort of power or nondual awareness, the 
latter ostensibly in the service of criticizing cultural distinctions and their 
attendant injudicious distributions of power and privilege. I find such 
generally social–historical explanations unsatisfactory, for two reasons. 
First, I am altogether unconvinced that anyone would actually consume 
feces, menstrual blood, and urine for purely socioeconomic reasons. 
There simply must be something else going on. Personal incredulity, 
however, does not establish a scholarly position—thus, my second 
reason: social–historical explanations linger in Mary Douglas’ shadow. 
Douglas’ hypothesis that dirt is a cultural construction is at best incom- 
plete and at worst outright mistaken. 
What is dirty and disgusting is not of exhaustively cultural origins. 
Granted, culture may manipulate disgust and dirt for social purposes, 
but biology plays a significant role in what we do and do not find dis- 
gusting. Leading researcher on disgust and hygiene Valerie A. Curtis 
notes, 
 
There is a link between dirt, disgust, hygiene and disease, but it is a 
link that predates history, that predates science and culture, that  even 
predates Homo sapiens. Disgust has a long evolutionary history; the 
reason it is part of our psyche is neither primarily cultural nor histori- 
cal, but biological. (2007: 660) 
 
There is indeed a good biological reason why feces are so easily 
found disgusting but ice cream is not. Precisely in this regard, and 
despite the impression we may get from Douglas and those who adopt 
her approach, “Cultures don’t quite have free rein as to what to exclude 
 
from the polluting. .  .  . Menstrual blood, human sperm and excrement, 
and other excreta of the human body seem to resist being innocuous 
substances” (Miller 1997: 44). Recognizing that the two general 
approaches in the recent study of disgust have been the phenomenologi- 
cal and evolutionary (Fessler and Haley 2006)—the former more often 
than not being privileged among social historians and cultural 
anthropologists—it is my position here that the evolutionary selection 
pressure for disgust—that is, the ever-present threat of parasitic 
infection—renders transparent for the first time the deep, religious logic 
of hard-core Tantric sādhana. 
Disgust is an emotion. Emotion research generally recognizes 
primary and secondary emotions. Secondary emotions build off the 
primary ones. Combining primary emotions, much like combining 
primary colors, renders a more robust spectrum of emotional life. 
While secondary emotions, for example, nostalgia, are amenable to 
analysis—nostalgia is a combination of sadness and happiness (Power 
and Tarsia 2007: 20)—the primary emotions appear irreducible. What 
is more, unlike the secondary emotions, primary emotions are universal, 
that is, found cross-culturally. 
Many have attempted to delimit the range of primary emotions. 
Despite the occasional variance, all such lists include disgust, an inclu- 
sion cross-cultural research clearly supports. Elwood and Olatunji note 
that similarities do in fact exist between cultures with regard to the 
“signal, physiological response, antecedents, and function of disgust” 
(2009: 101). They also note, significantly for us, that on the top of the 
list of universal disgust antecedents or elicitors are feces and menstrual 
blood (ibid.: 111; Kristeva 1982: 71). Other universal elicitors include 
decay and spoiled food, particular living creatures such as worms and 
helminthes, certain categories of “other people,” and violations of mor- 
ality and social norms (Curtis and Biran 2001: 21). We will return to 
these disgust elicitors below. For now, we are right to assume that 
disgust is indeed a primary and thus universal emotion (see also Angyal 
1941; Ekman and Friesen 1971; Ekman et al. 1987; Rozin and Fallon 
1987; Ekman 1992; Rozin et al. 2000; Elwood and Olatunji 2009: 117; 
Olatunji and McKay 2009; Kelly 2011). 
Emotions often trump reason. A simple case of road rage tends to 
bear this out (Boyer 2001: 186). Expediting behaviors the more elabo- 
rate cognitive processes would possibly delay (Wilson 2002: 42), emo- 
tions contributed to the survival of the human animal’s ancestors. 
Neuro-anatomy reflects this bio-historical importance. LeDoux (1996) 
points out that the emotional centers of the human brain are located in 
the older portions, particularly the amygdale complex, demonstrating 
 
that our evolutionary ancestors were far more prone to “analyzing” 
complex, environmental scenarios using their “gut reactions.” He 
writes, “By way of the amygdale . . . the brain is programmed to detect 
dangers. . . . Prepackaged responses [i.e. emotions] have been shaped by 
evolution and occur . . . as Darwin points out, involuntarily” (1996: 
174–175). Though LeDoux explicitly references dangers here, the adap- 
tive behaviors emotions motivated and motivate generally fall into two 
classes, what I call the promotional and the prophylactic. 
Promotional emotions encourage the organism to engage in various 
behaviors that are beneficial to the organism’s biological wellbeing. 
Alternatively, prophylactic emotions discourage behaviors detrimental 
to the organism’s biological wellbeing. By behaviors beneficial or detri- 
mental to an organism’s biological wellbeing, I specifically mean those 
behaviors that either promote or disrupt first the organism’s maturation 
to reproductive capacity and then eventual reproductive success. Such 
maturation and reproductive success constitute the twin goals of the 
naturally selected human body (Bittles and Neel 1994). As a prophylac- 
tic emotion, disgust contributes to what has been called “the behavioral 
immune system” (Schaller and Duncan 2007: 296), that is, that suite of 
behaviors intended to protect the organism from environmental dangers. 
Disgust research generally recognizes two types of disgust, animal- 
nature disgust and core disgust. Animal-nature disgust is a cultural elab- 
oration of core disgust (Haidt et al. 1994). The leading researcher on 
disgust, Paul Rozin, and his colleagues note: 
 
Core disgust appears to have been elaborated into  a  more  complex 
moral emotion that we call animal nature disgust in which actions and 
events that remind us that we are animals are repressed, hidden, or 
condemned. Such regulation of bodily functions, including sex, eating, 
defecating, and hygiene, are often incorporated into the moral codes of 
cultures and religions . . . where they appear to function as guardians 
of the soul against pollution and degradation. (1999: 575) 
 
To be reminded that one is an animal is in effect to be reminded 
that one is a bleeding, defecating, and ultimately expiring organism 




8The curious exception appears to be tears. Unlike their feeling for other bodily exuviae, humans 
do not seem to find tears disgusting. Rozin et al. propose that tears do not elicit disgust because 
they appear to be uniquely human and are thus incapable of signaling an irreducible tie to animal 
embodiment (Rozin et al. 2000). With the possible exception of tears, bodily excreta disgust us. 
 
this reality that often disgusts us today (Rozin et al. 1997). To guard 
against such grave reminders, cultures articulate an “ethics of divinity,” 
that is, an ethics constituting the third limb of what has been called the 
CAD triad hypothesis (Shweder et al. 1997; Rozin et al. 2000; Haidt 
and Algoe 2004). 
The CAD triad hypothesis suggests that there is a triad of social 
emotions that aim to establish order and psychological equanimity 
within human society. Initially an acronym for community–autonomy– 
divinity, CAD, similarly comes to stand for the emotions elicited when 
transgressions occur in any one of these domains. For instance, trans- 
gressions against the community elicit contempt. Transgressions against 
autonomy elicit anger. Significantly for us, transgressions against divin- 
ity elicit disgust. The “ethics of divinity” are in this regard socio- 
religious codes, ostensibly arising out of our animal-nature disgust, that 
distance our sense of self or, and better yet, soul from our sense of our 
animality, our embodiment. Curtis (2007) rightly points out that many 
religious texts, including the dharmasūtras and dharmaśāstras, identify, 
vilify, and consequently proscribe contact with precisely those elements 
of human excreta that are universally found disgusting. Despite  what 
appear to be rather recent, fashionable, and not to mention seemingly 
romantic studies concerning the  sanguine  relationship  between  religion 
and the body, the body and its products generally offend the religious 
sensibility (Becker 1973).9 For such reasons, Miller proposes,  “ulti- 
mately the basis for all disgust is us—that we live and die and that the 
process is a messy one emitting substances and  odors  that  make  us 
doubt ourselves and fear our neighbors” (1997: xiv). Cox et al. similarly 
remark, “many biological entities and processes elicit feelings of disgust 
because they are associated with our animal nature, which in  turn are 
associated with our ultimate mortality” (2007: 504). 
Threats of impermanence and metaphysical insignificance disgust 
us (Rank 1945; Nilsson 1954; Brown 1959; Becker 1973; Yalom 1980; 
Dennett 1995; Pyszczynksi et al. 2003). Remedying such an unwel- 
comed reality, humans generally abide “the vital lie” (Becker 1973: 47; 
see also Pyszczynski et al. 2003). This lie routinely employs a dualism. 
 
Antagonism between the mental (eternal, ethereal, sacred) and the cor- 
poreal (temporal, material, profane) is expressed in many intellectual 
traditions (e.g. dualism), religious convictions (e.g. the soul), and cul- 
tural practices (e.g. excessive grooming and adornment), all seeking to 
 
 
9In a moment of hygienic irony, it may have been the Essenes’ hypervigilance concerning bodily 
refuse as an offense against God that led to their comparatively early deaths (Zias et al. 2006). 
 
instill humankind with an immortal essence independent of the body 
and thus view the self as free from accidental termination or eventual 
dissolution from the ravages of time. (Landau et al. 2006: 131) 
 
While mind–body dualism is clearly existentially soothing, not to 
mention cognitively intuitive and thus satisfying (Bering 2002, 2006; 
Barrett 2004; Bloom 2004), it is by all classical and contemporary scien- 
tific and philosophical accounts illusory, if not in fact delusory (Freud 
1927; Dennett 1991; Flanagan 2002; Searle 2004; Dawkins 2006; 
Slingerland 2008). Serving as an existential prophylaxis, animal-nature 
disgust discourages our recognition of and ultimately admission to this 
reality. Perhaps we do need the vital lie. The same prophylaxis, 
however, becomes rather troubling, from at least one biological perspec- 
tive, when it applies to sexual intercourse. 
Although it is of utmost importance to the survival of a sexually 
reproducing species, sexual intercourse can become a source of great 
disgust, anxiety, and occasionally psychopathology for the human 
animal (de Jong and Peters 2009). Terror management researchers per- 
suasively argue that sex is problematic in that it too reminds us of our 
animality (Goodenough 1998; Goldenberg et al. 1999: 1175; see also 
Goldenberg et al. 2002). Accordingly, humans must, in the service of 
genetic propagation, mitigate their animal-nature disgust concerning 
sexuality. This they do with notions of romantic love. Love transmutes a 
bestial act into one between soul mates. “Romantic love, like religion, is 
a vitally important human motive because it elevates us beyond our 
animal nature to an abstract spiritual plane of existence; we become 
soul mates with our beloved” (Goldenberg et al. 2000: 206–207). I 
believe the South Asian categories of kāma and prema (Marglin 1982) 
serve a similar function.10 
While talk of love, soul mates, and methodical techniques may facil- 
itate the sexual act for some, for others such facilitation is apparently 
inadequate. Some continue to struggle. This is potentially more true for 
the human male, significantly for us the gender most associated with 





10Of course, and though often set apart as if the former is animal sex and the latter spiritual 
bonding, these categories are a bit more nuanced. Prema does indeed transcend kāma, but kāma 
transcends pure animal sexuality. Clearly insistent that the sexual act must be submitted to self- 
aware method, the Kāmasūtra distinguishes pure animal sexuality from human sexuality, indirectly 
indicating that to submit to the uncontrolled former is to forfeit the methodical latter (Doniger 
and Kakar 2002). The Kāmasūtra ministers to our animal nature disgust. 
 
Because of men’s ardent sexual desire and their relatively more body- 
centered sexuality . . . they may be especially vulnerable to confronta- 
tions with their own corporeality via sexual attraction. This is 
consistent with the historical prevalence of men’s association between 
women’s sexual allure and death, hypervigilance over yielding to the 
pleasures of the flesh, and contempt and derision for women who 
provoke lustful thoughts. (see also Horney 1932; Kristeva 1982; 
Goldenberg and Roberts 2004; Landau et al. 2006: 132) 
 
Here we broach the tragic and violent by-product of men’s animal- 
nature disgust regarding sexuality. Men can be existential misogynists. 
According to Martha Nussbaum, the constellation of male sexual desire 
and existential anxiety makes woman the locus of male disgust:  “The 
woman becomes disgusting and slimy because she is the vehicle of the 
man’s semen. She becomes, by projection, the bearer of all those animal 
characteristics from which the male would like to dissociate himself” 
(2001: 221). Elsewhere she adds, “Misogyny has typically seen the 
female as the site of the disgusting” (2004: 118). As many 
ethnographies attest, women and their menses are indeed often seen as 
polluting and dangerous (Bennett 1983; Meigs 1984; Buckley and 
Gottlieb 1988; Gilmore 2001; Fuller 2004). This imputation of ( 
partially) fictitious pol- lution and danger to menstruating women and 
the accompanying sexist politics unfortunately put on display the human 
male’s animal-nature disgust  regarding  sexual  intercourse.11 
Animal-nature disgust attends reminders that we are bleeding, defe- 
cating, and sexually reproducing animals. In that we pretend to be dis- 
embodied and immortal, that which disgusts is antipathetic to the 
religious life. Rozin et al. rightly note, “Disgust can be understood as a 
defense against a universal fear of death . . . [it] guards the sanctity of 




11We should immediately note, however, that empirical research suggests that the menstruating 
woman can be disgusting to both men and women. Goldenberg and Roberts report that “when 
reminded of women’s more creaturely nature by the tampon, both men and women endorsed a 
less ‘physical,’ more appearance-oriented standard for women’s bodies” (2004: 78).  Here the 
authors point out that objectifying women may be one of the misogynistic ways men—and quite 
possibly women as well—deal with sexual disgust. Goldenberg adds, “Women play a more obvious 
role in reproduction (i.e., women menstruate, lactate, and bear children) and, to the extent that 
reproductive processes are threatening reminders of creatureliness, objectification of women’s 
bodies may provide a viable defense” (Goldenberg 2005: 226). Men and women indeed appear 
prone to downplaying the physicality of feminine sexuality and biology by objectifying elements of 
the body as well as emphasizing cultural “sanitations” such as perfumes, make-up, and clothing. 
“Sexual objectification of women serves to strip women of their connection to nature. . . . Sexual 
objectification occurs when a woman’s body, body parts, or sexual functions are separated from 
her person, or regarded as if they are capable of representing her” (ibid.: 76). 
 
Kakar 1989). Though generally agreeing with this position, I believe it 
ultimately lacks an important distinction. Animal-nature disgust indeed 
guards the sanctity of “the soul.” Such disgust apparently motivates the 
pursuit of renunciation in South Asian traditions (Masson 1976, 1980; 
White 2009). It is, however, core disgust that guards the purity of the 
body. As the classical philosophical conundrum attests, these are sepa- 
rate considerations. I propose that animal-nature disgust ultimately 
reflects memetic concerns. Memetic concerns arise out of adherence to 
a set of ideas, or memes (Dawkins 1976: 192; see also Aunger 2010), 
for example, body and soul dualism. Core disgust, on the other hand, 
guards genetic interests. 
Many suggest that core disgust evolved to protect the organism 
against the ingestion of lethal pathogens, remedying in this way the 
“omnivore’s dilemma” (see also Rozin and Fallon 1987; Haidt et al. 
1997: 109). To be sure, an extended history of gastronomic plasticity 
selected for some regulatory mechanisms and behaviors (Sherman and 
Billing 1999; Fessler and Navarette 2003b). Fessler and Navarette suc- 
cinctly note, “Disease prophylaxis via regulation of ingestion is a princi- 
pal ultimate function of disgust” (2003a: 408; see also Sawchuk 2009: 
84). Surely the universal, visceral displays of disgust support such a 
position. 
As early as Darwin (1965 [1872]), emotion researchers noted that 
the universally recognized disgust reaction entails—most significantly 
for us—a lolling tongue as well as downward turned corners of the 
mouth and a crinkled nose, behaviors in the service of expelling some- 
thing from the opening to the alimentary canal as well as the forestal- 
ling of further incorporation of noxious odors. Animal-nature disgust 
may indeed find fecal matter disgusting because it reminds of the 
embodied condition and thus death; core disgust, however, finds such 
matter disgusting because it is the source of microbial contaminants 
and thus actually threatens death. Kālī’s lolling tongue and its culinary 
preferences notwithstanding, human tongues were not selected for rel- 
ishing excreta. Thus, “whilst the specifics of what we find disgusting 
are, of course, shaped by experience and culture, there is an overall bio- 
logical pattern to our revulsions. Disgust of dirt is a part of human 
nature” (Curtis 2007: 660). 
Historically speaking, disgust research emphasizes gustatory con- 
cerns. Such emphasis ought not to dissuade us from recognizing that 
the emotion goes beyond the gustatory. A careful review of recent 




Rozin and Fallon (1987) note the widespread disgust at animal prod- 
ucts and suggest a universal human need to protect the soul from 
reminders of the mortal and animal nature of the human body. We 
believe that these aversions can be better explained from an evolution- 
ary perspective as evolved aversions to potential sources of disease 
which pose the threat not just of mortality, but of genetic extinction. 
We suggest that the disgust emotion polices the vulnerable portals of 
the body, defending them from the ingress of pathogens and parasites. 
(Curtis and Biran 2001: 29; see also Rubio-Godoy et al. 2007: 61–62)12 
 
Though rightly associated with the gustatory, disgust is ultimately in 
the service of forestalling contact with potential sources of disease as 
such. I propose that there are three such sources—the gustatory, the 
sexual, and the macro-social. 
Core sexual disgust serves two similar though appreciably different 
functions. Fessler and Navarette (2003a) note, for instance, that sexual 
disgust fluctuates with the menstrual cycle. Male test subjects routinely 
find the notion of sex most disgusting when the female partner is men- 
struating. These authors go on to suggest that many so-called aberrant 
sexual behaviors evoke disgust. What apparently makes sexual acts 
“aberrant” and thus evocative of core disgust is their fitness  reducing 
nature: “sexual disgust is an adaptation that functions to inhibit partici- 
pation in biologically suboptimal sexual unions” (ibid.: 407); “natural 
selection . . . coopted a mechanism that originally guarded  the  body 
against pathogens and toxins, employing it to preclude fitness-reducing 
sexual behavior as well” (ibid.: 414).13 What is perhaps most interesting 
here is that while sex with a temporarily infertile partner is fitness- 
reducing and thus evocative of core disgust, the very selection of sexual 
reproduction itself betrays the parasitological pressures that truly inform 
the primary emotion of core (sexual) disgust (Tooby 1982;  Ridley 
1993). 
While menstrual sex may be found disgusting because it is not pro- 
ductive, widespread disgust felt for incestuous unions reflect concerns 




12The disgust felt for microbial pathogens even serves today, some have argued, as a deterrent 
against biological and chemical warfare (Cole 1998). 
13Here we can note that Martha Nussbaum’s recent book, From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual 
Orientation and Constitutional Law (2010), argues that disgust with homosexuality is purely 
cultural and easily eradicable with the appropriate laws and education. Though I am in agreement 
that the disgust felt for homosexuality leads to untoward legal and cultural practices and behaviors 
deserving condemnation and correction, Nussbaum may be incorrect. Maybe the disgust felt for 
homosexuality by some reflects disgust felt for suboptimal sexual unions. 
901 
 
It is, of course, generally recognized that incestuous unions often 
produce compromised offspring. Physical and observed behavioral com- 
promises most often reflect recessive allele homozygosity, a condition 
most probable with consanguine unions (Bittles and Neel 1994). 
Kumaramanickavel et al. (2002) document, for instance, ocular genetic 
diseases prominent amid the Dravidian community in Chennai, India, 
a community known for consanguine unions. Occasionally and tragi- 
cally, a recessive trait codes for a lethal disease, for example, sickle cell 
anemia. When homozygosity is realized in such instances, the progeny 
dies. While lethal allele homozygosity is fitness-reducing and as such 
those unions likely leading to such a condition are often found disgust- 
ing, recent research has begun to narrow in on what may be most evoc- 
ative of core disgust with regard to incest. 
Consanguine sexual intercourse prevents the generation of a novel 
immune system in the offspring. This is a primary concern because 
immunological novelty ensures that parasites adapted to the host’s 
immune system and thus thriving furtively will once again be detectable 
and thus eradicable in the progeny (Hart 1990). To be sure, due to 
their short-term generation rate, parasites can quickly evolve adapta- 
tions to the host’s immune system, achieving thereby a certain immuno- 
logical occlusion. Immunologically occluded parasites pass on to the 
progeny. If the progeny’s immune system is too alike those of his 
parents, then the transferred parasite may enjoy continued occlusion 
and thus prove detrimental, if not fatal, to the young organism whose 
constitution is not robust enough to defend against the parasite or 
pathogen. Consanguine sexual partners simply do not provide enough 
genetic novelty for the offspring’s major histocompatibility complex or 
MHC. The MHC enables the immune system’s recognition of foreign 
bodies. Penn and Potts explain, 
 
The MHC genes encode class I and II MHC molecules, cell-surface 
glycoproteins, that present peptide antigens to T-lymphocytes. 
Through antigen presentation, MHC genes play a central role in con- 
trolling the development and the activation of the immune system, 
including both cellular and anti-body mediated defenses. (1999: 150) 
 
For progeny to enjoy a more robust defense against the immunolog- 
ically occluded pathogens of its parents, and thus enjoy a reproductive 
advantage, that organism’s MHC genes need to be heterozygous. The 
importance of MHC heterozygosity is reflected in the pronounced poly- 
morphisms of the alleles. Indeed, the number of different alleles associ- 
ated  with  the  MHC  in  human  populations  “is  more  frequent  than 
 
expected by chance” and as such most likely reflects the “selective 
advantage under pathogen stress” (see also Tooby 1982; Wedekind and 
Furi 1997: 1471; Penn and Potts 1999). The polymorphism of the MHC 
genes—actually known as HLA or human leukocyte antigens in human 
animals—ensures a greater diversity of heterozygous combinations 
which in turn prove more effective against host-adapting parasites.14 As 
it is with core gustatory disgust, so too with core sexual disgust: both 
serve the promotion of pathogen and parasite defense. Robert A. Hinde 
summarizes, 
 
Sex probably arose because sexual reproduction enables an organism to 
detect parasites. Many infectious agents can mutate in a manner which 
enables them to remain undetected by the immune system of the host, 
but the immune system of genetically distinct offspring, produced by 
sexual reproduction involving individuals who are not too closely 
related, is able to spot them. Inbreeding between closely related indi- 
viduals produces less genetic distinctiveness, and thus less immunologi- 
cal protection in the offspring. In addition . . . inbreeding can lead to 
recessive lethal alleles becoming homozygous. (1999: 179)15 
 
Because pathogen undetectability and lethal allele homozygosity 
clearly threaten genetic extinction, incestuous sexual intercourse elicits 
core disgust (Lieberman et al. 2007). 
While sexual relations with a close relative threatens genetic extinc- 
tion due to compromising the progeny’s ability to produce novel 
defenses against host-adapting pathogens as well as risking the presen- 
tation of lethal allele homozygosity, the exact opposite is the case when 
it comes to ingesting another human’s “moons.” Though disgust may 
eventually be co-opted into the service of excluding social others on a 
rather arbitrary basis—or so the Douglasian scholars reviewed above 
argue—there may actually be a more compelling parasitological reason 
for such macro-social exclusions (Kurzban and Leary 2001). 
 
An aversion to contact with others, varying with the degree of familiar- 
ity, might also be advantageous. Although close family often share a 





14Several recent studies have in fact documented female sexual preference for men whose body 
odors may announce their MHC dissimilarity from the woman (Wedekind et al. 1995; Wedekind 
and Furi 1997; Wedekind and Penn 2000). 
15Although incestuous relationships lead to “inbreeding depression,” there are occasions when 
inbreeding may prove to be the optimal reproductive strategy (Kokko and Ots 2006). 
 
which the insider is not yet immune. Disgust serves as an excellent 
trigger to their avoidance. (Curtis and Biran 2001: 25) 
 
Immunologically speaking, the macro-social, out-of-group other is 
rightly seen as parasitologically strange and thus dangerous. It is this 
biological reality that informs xenophobia and ethnocentrism (Faulkner 
et al. 2004; Navarrete and Fessler 2006). Throughout history, the parasi- 
tologically strange, macro-social other has been the agent of destruction 
of whole civilizations (Diamond 1997; Mayr 2001). Thus, others, espe- 
cially those who violate the morals and social norms of the group, that 
is, the ethics of divinity—behaviors associated with an out-of-group 
other—may elicit disgust for good biological reasons. Conversely, 
abiding by the larger group’s ethics of divinity, one effectively commu- 
nicates one’s hygienic proximity; after all, “disgust is . . . the name we 
give to the motivation to behave hygienically” (Curtis 2007: 661). I 
believe we broach here a tentative, biological explanation for both the 
promotion of caste endogamy as well as the core macro-social disgust 
felt for Tantric transgressions thereof. 
If one needs a sexual partner with a dissimilar genotype for the sake 
of producing progeny with novel immune systems, this dissimilarity 
often comes with the price of mating with an out-of-group other. If the 
out-of-group other is a potential carrier of a novel parasite, then the 
need for a dissimilar genotype is compromised by the possibility of par- 
asitic infection. This is the sexually reproducing organism’s reproductive 
dilemma. One could mitigate this parasitological concern if only one 
could rest assured that the out-of-group other abides by similar hygienic 
codes. Caste endogamy potentially mitigates the concern. The out- of-
group sexual partner in South Asia need not be and often is clearly 
not out-of-caste. Castes constitute, on at least one register, “hygiene 
societies” that cross geographic boundaries (McNeill 1976). For 
instance, the Brahmin groom in village A can ostensibly rest assured 
that his Brahmin bride from village B is genetically dissimilar while also 
hygienically similar. In this regard, the prevalence of caste concerns in 
South Asia quite possibly reflects parasitologically driven collectivism 
(Fincher and Thornhill 2008; Fincher et al. 2008; see also Triandis 
2001). If this is the case, then the Tantric hero’s out-of-caste partner 
threatens unfamiliar hygienic practices and thus potential parasitic 
infection. That the lowest castes are often associated with bodily excreta 
and perceived bloody occupations may not be a biological accident; 
after all, caste impurities and purities often focus on food and sexual 
concerns and thus pathogen-evoked disgust (Rozin et al. 1997; 
Appadurai 1981). Despite any untoward, political ramifications, it is 
 
reproductively advantageous for certain intimate groups to view suspi- 
ciously, and with disgust no less, the “parasitological stranger.” As an 
out-of-caste partner, especially one hailing from a lower caste, the 
Tantric hero’s yoginī is clearly parasitologically strange. Exoteric, para- 
sitic threat accompanies mystical incest. In such attempts to transcend 
biologically informed dualities through engagement with the parasitic, 
hard-core Tantra puts on display the irrevocable reality of biological 
selfhood. 
In addition to seeing disgust as a cultural construction, most social 
scientists see the self as a cultural construction. It is not. Self-other dis- 
tinctions do not first arise with language and culture. Selfhood origi- 
nates with the immune system. Accordingly, the first social other is not 
the macro- but rather micro-social other. The biologist Neil A. 
Campbell notes, “Implicit in the immune system’s ability to recognize 
foreign molecules and cells . . . is its capacity to recognize the body’s 
own molecules as native—that is, to distinguish self from  nonself” 
(1987: 852). Rubio-Godoy et al. add, “All animals are able to differenti- 
ate self from non-self, a prerequisite for life. . . . An organism’s ability 
to recognize its individuality enables it to preserve its integrity through 
immunity” (2007: 61). At a most basic, biological level, my identity 
begins with my immune system, that is, with my major histocompat- 
ability complex and this even prior to birth: “The vertebrate immune 
system develops the ability to discriminate self/non-self (before birth) 
by randomly generating a wide diversity of T-cells with highly specific 
antigenic receptors and then eliminating and suppressing those that rec- 
ognize self-antigens presented by MHC molecules” (Penn and Potts 
1999: 150). Duality attends immunity. While the macro-social other is a 
potential carrier of parasites and pathogens, the micro-social other is 
the parasite or pathogen itself. Certain macro-social concerns may await 
culture, language, and social history; micro-social concerns cannot. 
The immune system and the emotion of disgust form a neurological 
continuum (Rubio-Godoy et al. 2007). When the disgust reaction fails 
in its prophylactic mission, the immune system kicks into gear. Both 
significantly mediated by serotonin, disgust and immunity are the 
primary players in the organism’s viability. It is the maintenance of this 
viability and thus identity that establishes the not-so-blank slate on 
which culture eventually writes. 
 
The parts of the body that interface with the environment are more 
perceived, and more intimately associated with the self, than are the 
inner parts of the body. Congruent with an evolutionary perspective, 
this pattern likely reflects an underlying neural architecture explicable 
 
in terms of the adaptive advantages of more extensive attention to and 
command over those parts of the body through which interaction with 
the environment occurs. (see also Rozin et al. 1995; Fessler and Haley 
2006: 15) 
 
We apparently associate our macro-sense of self more intimately 
with such body parts as the mouth and genitals not because of arbitrary 
cultural divisions, but because our micro-sense of self demands it. 
Bodily orifices are the sites of commerce with the parasitological other. 
Our cognitive and emotional resources are in this way heavily invested 
in those parts of the body that engage in the most exchange with the 
outside world (Fessler and Haley 2006: 7). That the self so heavily 
polices the boundaries between inside and out—and this at both cellular 
and whole-organism levels—betrays the fact that disgust and immunity 
play significant roles in our “construction” of identity.16 
Because core disgust was—and continues to be—in the service of 
excluding undesirable substances and activities due to the ever-present 
pressure of parasites and other pathogenic microorganisms, it easily 
became co-opted by systems in the service of excluding and rejecting 
untoward realities as such.17 Such cultural elaboration of core disgust 
into animal-nature disgust finds no better manifestation than in “main- 
line” religion. Religion is indeed at war with the body because the body 
is the vehicle of mortality (Parry 1989; Bloch 1992; Glucklich 2001; 
White 2003).18 The irony is that where religion’s animal-nature disgust 
motivates a flight from the body, the zenith of this flight dialectically 
reverses course (Taylor 2007) and reengages the body. Religion’s war 
against the body ends not with a fantastic denial of the body in a 
moment of monistic idealism, but rather with the body’s practical sub- 
jugation. Winning the war against the body, that is, the source of 
animal-nature disgust, ultimately entails confounding that which 
intends to protect the very source of such disgust. This is Tantra’s cam- 




16It is quite fashionable in South Asian studies to suggest that in South Asia “dividuals” are 
more common than individuals, that is, South Asian self-identity has fluid boundaries. Although 
such a position is indeed fashionable, it fails to persuade (Parry 1989; Openshaw 2002). 
17This apparently even applies to propositional statements we find undesirable. Recent 
functional magnetic resonance imaging studies of the human brain note that when test subjects 
broach material with which they disagree, the same neural networks associated with monitoring 
oral disgust are activated (Harris et al. 2008). People and propositions that differ from us do in fact 
disgust us. 
18I believe the argument could be made that what has now become a seemingly “pro-body” 
exercise regimen, hatha yoga’s bodily contortions may equally have arisen through a desire to 
commandeer  the  boḋy-as-enemy. 
 
fronts:  the  gustatory,  sexual,  and  macro-social.  Tantra  intentionally 
courts the parasitic. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE BIOLOGY OF TANTRA 
Self-aware embodiment is the dilemma (Miller 1997); religion is the 
solution (Bloch 1992). Despite the troubles with characterizing religion 
as such (Fitzgerald 2000; McCutcheon 2001; Smith 2004), I concur with 
White: “Transcending the human condition . . . seems to constitute the 
motor of every religious system” (2003: 99; Pyszczynski et al. 2003: 20). 
The human condition is first and foremost the embodied condition. 
Humans pursue bodily transcendence by one of the two paths. The first 
and by far most popular path downplays, if not openly denigrates, the 
importance of the body and bodily life. Most individuals on this path 
hold tightly to a nonnatural duality between soul and body (Flanagan 
2002) and as such abide the “ethics of divinity” associated with the 
CAD triad hypothesis. At its best, this path openly endorses idealism, 
suggesting material realities do not exist at all. In the service of such 
idealisms, humans co-opt the naturally selected emotion of core disgust 
to color emotionally the distinction between body and soul. This is 
animal-nature disgust. Animal-nature disgust motivates the pursuit of 
“mainline” religion, including the Hindu path of renunciation (Masson 
1976, 1980; White 2009). For mainline practitioners, Tantra is under- 
standably animal-nature disgusting. 
Tantra flagrantly violates the Hindu ethics of divinity, enjoining pre- 
cisely those activities that most remind us of our animality.19 Tantric 
practitioners are in fact often exhorted to behave like animals (Haidt 
et al. 1994: 712; see also Jha 1995: 90; Openshaw 2002: 209). From the 
perspective of animal-nature disgust, being animal-like and being reli- 
gious are understandably antithetical, and yet such a constellation con- 
stitutes hard-core Tantra. By celebrating, albeit alchemically (White 
1996) and thus most fantastically, bodily excreta as well as sexual 
 
 
19By “Hindu ethics of divinity,” I mean primarily those purity and pollution codes most 
associated with the dharmasūtra and dharmaśāstra literature. In this regard,  the “ethics of 
divinity”—Hindu or otherwise—is simply meant to capture that rather widespread concern in most 
religious traditions with one’s hygiene, especially when approaching objects or persons thought to 
be sacred or divine. I also want to acknowledge here that there are religions that seem to celebrate 
the body and nature generally. In such cases, I believe these traditions ultimately “supernaturalize” 
nature. The “nature” of these traditions tends to take on fantastic characteristics. Goldenberg et al. 
note, “Cultures that construe human life as closely connected to other animals and the natural 
environment tend to imbue all of nature with supernatural power and significance . . . the nature 
they are one with is supernatural rather than natural” (2000: 214; see also Goldenberg et al. 2001). 
 
intercourse with menstruating, esoterically incestuous, out-of-caste 
women, Tantra confounds—whether genuinely or counterphobically 
(Fenichel 1945; Kakar 1981; Langer 2002)—the results of those social– 
psychological studies that document a widespread, robust animal-nature 
disgust. Although it may be seen as evoking animal-nature disgust, I 
argue that Tantra more accurately evokes core disgust. It is not simply 
that Tantric practitioners are acting like animals, and thus remind us 
that we too are animals and thus doomed to death and decay, that dis- 
gusts us. Likewise, it is clearly not the case that we find Tantra disgust- 
ing because of some confusion of arbitrary, macro-social divisions and 
boundaries. On the contrary, “the process of evolution ensures that 
there is a tight fit between our values and desires and the structure of 
the world in which we have developed” (Slingerland 2008: 8). 
Explaining “typical Tantric disgustingness” (Wedemeyer 2007: 391) 
thus requires us to realize first that there are two types of disgust—a 
realization clearly absent in Tantric studies to date—and second that we 
rightly view Tantra as disgusting because it subverts “biological 
wisdom.” The biological disgust we have for Tantra is the same core 
disgust we ultimately have for religion when it is pushed to its logical 
conclusion, a conclusion constituting the second religious path. 
If the body is indeed a great source of anxiety—as it most certainly 
is for the majority of Hindus, not to mention most people around the 
world—then the most robust plan of action would be to defeat bodily 
realities, not to deny them fantastically as idealism is often wont to do. 
While its many variants appear committed to such an accomplishment, 
idealism and its symbolic systems never work: “Because culture is a 
symbolic solution to the very physical problem of death . . . no culture 
(regardless of how powerful and convincing) can ever completely eradi- 
cate the terror engendered by the awareness of death” (Pyszczynski 
et al. 2003: 30). It is the routine failure of the idealistic and symbolic 
that ushers in the success of the materialistic and practical. The practi- 
cal attack constitutes hard-core Tantra. To be sure, the two practices 
constitutive of hard-core Tantra—the consumption of pathogen-rich 
excreta and maximally suboptimal sexual intercourse with an out-of- 
caste and thus parasitologically strange partner—are not accidental cul- 
tural constructions. Rather, it is precisely these two practices, not others, 
that most offend the biological realities of the human organism. To 
convince oneself of one’s bodily transcendence may just require inten- 
tionally participating in activities most offensive to this body. 
Biologically speaking, the human body is well adapted. Enjoying the 
immune system and the primary emotion of core disgust, the human 
body comes predisposed to prosper biologically. Biological prosperity 
 
entails the accomplishment of two goals. First, the body must fight 
against the ingression of pathogens that could possibly lead to prema- 
ture death, a prematurity characterized as death-before-reproductive- 
success. Once reproductive maturity is reached—the first goal—the 
human animal seeks an appropriate partner with whom to engage in 
sexual intercourse, an activity primarily in the service of producing 
viable progeny—the second goal (Bittles and Neel 1994). A lifelong 
avoidance of pathogen-rich materials en route to nonincestuous, hetero- 
sexual intercourse with a nonmenstruating, sexually mature female is 
the biological goal of the human male. The twin goals of admittedly 
normative biology constitute “the enemy” against which Tantric 
heroes—who are men (Openshaw 2002: 14; White 2003: 160)—fight. In 
this regard, transcending the embodied condition requires abiding by a 
repertoire of memes that encourage the confounding of the biological 
condition. Precisely in this regard, it is truly no accident that “the 
tongue is the Tantric organ” (Kripal 1995: 305). As a core disgusting 
religion, Tantra employs the very organ used to expel pathogens for the 
exact opposite end. Tantra’s tongue relishes the pathogenic: “Kālī’s 
tongue . . . is not about shame but about the destruction of disgust” 
(ibid.: 305). Significantly, in its attempt to destroy (core) disgust, Kālī’s 
tongue approaches the destruction of the body itself. Offending the very 
reason for an immune system, Kālī’s tongue consumes the other’s 
moons. Likewise, sexual intercourse with an incestuous, menstruating, 
riding-astride, out-of-caste partner appears to be the most suboptimal 
intraspecific sexual union of which the human animal is capable.20 
Clearly, a menstruating woman is temporarily infertile. Likewise, 
though perhaps a fact often unnoticed, the woman-astride position is 
the least conducive for insemination.21 What is more, even if progeny 
were to issue from the union, the antibiological intention behind the 
admittedly fantasied incestuous act is one of producing a lethal allele 
homozygous child or a child with an MHC too similar to the parents’, 
both conditions contributing to the likelihood of premature death. 
White suggests that Tantric sex was always primarily in the service 




20It should be noted that the incestuous component of the paradigm seldom plays out in reality. 
Indeed, the hero’s partner is generally from out-of-caste and thus cannot be his mother or sister. 
Accordingly, the evidence for Tantric disgust is not uniform. Whereas the incestuous intention 
remains merely an intention, the hero actually ingests orally pathogenic substances. I want to thank 
one of the anonymous reviewers for drawing to my attention the discrepancy between actual 
consumption of feces and the merely intended incestuous act. 
21The woman-astride position either intentionally or unintentionally employs gravity to aid in 
forestalling successful fertilization. 
 
varies. What we now realize is that the emic classification Jha presents 
occludes elements of biological significance. Recall, Curtis and Biran 
(2001) argue that the pathogenicity of others’ moons varies. Indeed, 
reporting the results of empirical research on forty thousand partici- 
pants, Curtis and her colleagues conclude, “sharing a person’s bodily 
fluids becomes more disgusting as that person becomes less familiar 
because strangers are more likely to carry novel pathogens and hence 
present a greater disease threat to a naïve immune system” (2004: S132; 
see also Hart 1990). With respect to Jha’s classification, we now note 
that the esoteric identification of one’s moons with one’s guru’s and/or 
guru’s wife’s occludes the significance of the biological distinction. To 
be sure, the guru and the guru’s wife are in effect “parasitological 
strangers,” that is, potential carriers of novel and thus offensive patho- 
gens. Likewise, placing one’s spouse’s moons in the yugal category 
obscures the fact that one’s spouse’s moons are more parasitologically 
familiar than is the guru’s, guru’s wife’s, or any indiscriminate other’s 
and are thus less biologically dangerous and less disgusting. These con- 
cerns ultimately inform the biologically transgressive nature of the 
yoginī’s out-of-caste status. Like the guru and guru’s wife, the yoginī is 
parasitologically strange. For this reason, it may not be an accident that 
the yoginī was often associated with birds, that is, with animals associ- 
ated with the transmission of disease and epidemic (White 2003: 58). 
After all, Tantric heroes actively sought out “cracks in the human 
immune system” (ibid.: 52). 
Courting the biologically dangerous is precisely where we locate the 
practical and thus completed nondualism of Tantra. As  Openshaw 
notes, Tantric practice is about the erasure of distinctions between self 
and nonself. Where Openshaw leaves this observation undeveloped is 
precisely with regard to the biology of identity. To erase truly the dis- 
tinction between self and nonself requires not the overcoming of arbi- 
trary, cultural divisions or the mental gymnastics of meditative 
regimens, but rather the ingestion of pathogenic substances.22 If self- 
other distinctions begin with the major histocompatability complex, as 
indeed they do, then to erase dualistic boundaries requires offending 
the immune system. Offending the immune system is the performative 
gustatory act of hard-core Tantra and it is only this act that truly real- 
izes, dangerously of course, nonduality. Thus, while for some Tantra 




22Indeed, I find, for example, that the deafferentation of the parietal lobes amounts to a fancy 
(meditation) parlor trick (Newberg et al. 2001); duality is only seemingly transcended. 
  
 
biological antimodel. In its attempt to be liberated from the only con- 
clusion the body promises, that is, death, Tantra becomes maladaptive. 
The purity and pollution codes of high South Asian culture that Tantra 
flouts are not arbitrary constructions of an accidental, social institution. 
Rather, the codes address what is universally found disgust- ing and 
are thus reflective of evoked culture. The universally disgusting serves a 
biological function no social–historical or cultural anthropolog- ical 
analysis can rightfully disregard. If not contest, then I at the very least 
complement the interpretations of Tantra we routinely receive from 
authors such as Kinsley, Olivelle, and Wedemeyer. It is irrevocably 
relevant that Tantric practitioners consume precise ly  these 
subs t ances  and not others. It is equally irrevocably relevant that 
Tantric practi tioners engage precisely the sexual unions they do, 
pursuing, as one sādhaka most tellingly put it, “the [anti-biological] 
ideal of non- procreation” (Openshaw 2002: 243). Indeed, “from ancient 
times these sādhaks are against childbirth” (Jha 1995: 98). To the 
extent that this is in fact the case, these sādhaks pursue genetic 
extinction: the consumption of pathogen-rich bio-toxins and the 
performance of maximally suboptimal sexual intercourse strike at the very 
raison d’être of the naturally selected human body. What better way 
for the mind/soul and its memes to win the universally religious war 
against the body and its genes than by intentionally offending the body 
precisely in those arenas naturally selected for its success? Hard-core 
Tantra sanctions the con- founding of the core disgust mechanism on the 
gustatory, sexual, and macro-social fronts. Tantra is literally and 
u n i v e r s a l l y  d i s gu s t i ng  because it is positively maladaptive. As a 
truly antibiological attempt to “reverse the flow of life” (Openshaw 
2002: 199; see also Bloch 1992), Tantra is the denouement of the 
universal, religio-martial campaign against the biological body.23 In this 
regard, and despite any initial revulsion, the core disgusting bodies and 
sexual activities constituting hard-core Tantric sādhana make of this 





23The extent to which the foregoing comments on other religious traditions is, I believe, 
something deserving scholarly attention. Do other religious traditions equally engage in 
antibiological behaviors? I believe they do. For instance, the consumption of heavy metals in the 
Daoist tradition of  wai-tan appears  comparable.  Likewise,  some  of  the  reports  concerning 
St. Francis of Assisi kissing the open sores of a leper and eating from a bowl mixed with the blood 
from a leper’s fingers clearly offends immunological wisdom (I’d like to thank Amir Hussain for 
drawing this latter example to my attention). Of course, only further, comparative research will 
decide this issue. For these reasons, I counsel other scholars in the study of religion to consider 
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